Key political and security trends likely to shape West Africa in 2026

West Africa is entering the coming year under the weight of accumulated pressure from multiple governance and economic events in 2025. Political authority and regional institutions are strained, and social resilience is being tested by insecurity, economic hardship, and climate shocks. For policymakers, investors and analysts, the key question is where shocks to the system will occur, and the possible disruptions that may result from them.

The attempted coup in Benin on 07 December underscored how even states long regarded as stable are no longer insulated from the contagion of elite fragmentation, security sector politicisation, and regional instability. Although the plot was foiled, the coup attempt gives us a direct preview into the crisis of democracy and political instability facing the region. Considering that Benin has often been cited as a democratic outlier in a neighbourhood marked by military takeovers, the episode revealed that political risk in West Africa is now less about regime type and more about the depth of institutional trust and the cohesion of ruling coalitions.

This context frames the outlook for the year ahead.

Sahel States Remain The Epicentre

At the centre of the regional risk landscape remains the Sahel, where political instability and armed insurgencies have defined the trajectory for the region. Military-led governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are moving from transitional ambiguity toward more entrenched forms of rule. In 2025, each regime took steps to consolidate authority through controlled political dialogues, constitutional revisions, or extensions of transition timelines. The coming year will test whether these processes generate even limited legitimacy or whether they harden popular disillusionment. For risk actors, the critical variable is not electoral scheduling alone, but the capacity of these states to manage dissent without triggering wider unrest or elite splits.

Closely linked is the future of the Alliance of Sahel States. Formed as a response to sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the bloc became more visible in 2025 through joint declarations and security coordination pledges. The next year will determine whether this alliance evolves into a functional political and economic platform or remains primarily a symbolic counterweight to ECOWAS. A more institutionalised AES would deepen regional fragmentation and complicate trade, mobility, and security cooperation across West Africa.

Security trends remain fluid rather than uniformly deteriorating. Jihadist violence continues to reshape rural governance across parts of the Sahel and northern coastal states, but 2025 showed that expansion is uneven. The coming year will hinge on whether militant groups prioritise territorial control, urban disruption, or consolidation of local alliances. Of equal concern is the proliferation of self-defence groups and informal security arrangements. These may provide short-term protection but often deepen communal fragmentation and complicate state authority.

The coming year will hinge on whether militant groups prioritise territorial control, urban disruption, or consolidation of local alliances.

Regional Organisations and Geopolitics

External actors will continue to recalibrate their engagement. In 2025, Russia-linked security partnerships expanded in visibility but faced questions about sustainability and civilian impact. Western governments increasingly shifted toward selective engagement focused on maritime security, migration management, and counterterrorism containment rather than democracy promotion. Gulf and Asian actors quietly expanded economic influence, particularly in energy, logistics, and infrastructure. The result is a crowded and transactional geopolitical environment in which West African states leverage competition but also risk overdependence on opaque arrangements.

ECOWAS itself faces a defining moment. The organisation entered 2025 weakened by its inability to reverse coups or enforce democratic norms, yet it avoided a full institutional rupture. The question ahead is whether ECOWAS can reposition as a pragmatic mediator rather than a punitive enforcer. Decisions around sanctions relief, reintegration pathways, and internal reform will shape its credibility. Failure to adapt risks rendering ECOWAS marginal, with long-term consequences for regional policy coordination and investor confidence.

Electoral politics will also be a key stress test. Several West African states are approaching elections or navigating post-election consolidation in environments marked by inflation, youth unemployment, and declining trust in political institutions. The lesson from 2025 is that elections alone no longer confer stability. Contested outcomes, judicial interventions, and security force behaviour matter more than formal timelines. The Benin coup attempt illustrated how elite grievances can metastasise even in the absence of mass mobilisation. Similar dynamics could surface elsewhere, particularly where incumbents rely on legal manoeuvres rather than broad-based legitimacy.

Economic pressures are likely to remain the most immediate driver of instability. Debt servicing burdens, subsidy reforms, and IMF-supported adjustment programmes have already triggered labour unrest and public anger in several countries during 2025. The next year will test governments’ ability to negotiate social bargains under fiscal constraint. Where states fail to cushion the impact of inflation and currency volatility, protests are likely to merge with broader political grievances, increasing the risk of sudden escalation.

Taken together, the outlook for West Africa is defined by cumulative stress rather than imminent collapse. The most resilient states will be those that retain institutional flexibility, manage elite cohesion, and offer credible mechanisms for political inclusion and economic relief. The most exposed will be those that rely primarily on coercion while neglecting social contracts. Overall, political risk in West Africa is now granular and fast moving. The lesson of 2025, from the Sahel to Benin, is that stability can no longer be inferred from past reputation alone.